Let’s get real: the prevailing strategy to deal with potentially nuclear Iran is working. Not only is it working, but it is the best course of action for the United States to take.
This strategy involves steadily increasing economic sanctions, covert action under the codename “Olympic Games,” to disrupt the development of nuclear weapons producing institutions within Iran, as well as diplomatic pressure short of an ultimatum. It conveys the message that the U.S. is insistent on preserving the nuclear order that exists, and mitigating the Iranian nuclear threat, but will not take belligerent action.
Stephen M. Walt, the prolific realist writer, comments that any course of action coerced by the U.S. would not last. Indeed, anyone who has worked with people knows that implementation of a policy or prescribed course of action requires all involved to take ownership of their place in that policy, or be fully coerced by some power. The U.S. will never be a fully coercive force on another nation-state, so it must act within its basic constraint: that a coercive solution will not last.
What, then? Sweep over Iran’s nuclear facilities when it grows dangerously close to building a weapon? Increase the already-damaging sanctions? Formulating policy requires first understanding the interests on both sides, translating that into a “why,” and becoming apprised of the constraints on your potential action: the policy menu.
Iranian nuclear expert Dr. Najmedin Meshkati identifies Iran’s motivations in acquiring a nuclear weapons program as, “a need to achieve prestige, assert national pride and secure what [it] sees as its natural dominance in the region.” With this, the reader undoubtedly jumps to the possible responses of, “so what, they’re not a nuclear weapons state,” “we don’t want Iran dominating the region, it’s not friendly,” and the like. There, you have the U.S. interest: prevent Iranian dominance in the Middle East so that the long-term goal of a liberalized Middle East lives to see another day. As the dominant country in the bilateral relationship, the U.S. is extra-sensitive to any dynamic in Iran’s behavior. Thus far, Iran’s rhetoric toward the U.S. and Israel has been enough to awaken hawkish segments of the American public and the American defense establishment. But Iran does not present a clear and present danger to the international community, as British intelligence services suggest, and may not even be actively developing a nuclear weapons program.
So let’s look at this issue through historical events, through analogues. Let’s remember that the religious leadership of Iran has decried nuclear weapons development as un-Islamic. But let’s remember, conversely, that it has refused to cooperate with I.A.E.A. inspection requests in the past, and in the most recent inspection, the I.A.E.A. was troubled by its findings. Let’s remember that both the U.S. and the E.U. have levied increased sanctions. Let’s remember that the rial is not doing too well, and there are calls to halt or reduce sanctions for humanitarian reasons.
To spell things out, it is not in the U.S. interest for Iran to continue to develop its nuclear weapons program, but it is not in the U.S. interest to confront Iran and risk conflict of any kind. For that matter, it is not in the U.S. interest to have Israel anywhere near close to confronting Iran. It is in the U.S. interest to provide incentives for Iran to pursue a non-nuclear weapons path. The existing “carrot and stick” approach has not worked with the Iranian regime, and likely will continue not to work. As Meshkati further points out, if Iran does not satisfactorily develop a nuclear bargaining chip, it is content to pursue asymmetrical and low-intensity conflict as its friend, Hezbollah, has.
Would it be in the U.S. interest to pursue regime change? A more cosmopolitan regime, untainted by the identifying factor of being a revolutionary movement against a liberal, westernized government, would be infinitely preferable for the U.S. It’s just that the U.S. hasn’t yet figured out how to read Middle Eastern political dynamics, and how to engineer at least a somewhat friendly, moderate, Middle Eastern nation untarnished by corruption. Individuals working for and with the U.S. government may now have the insights, linguistic, and historical background to perform meaningful analysis on the region’s politics, but the collective—the institution of the U.S. foreign policy body—is not smart enough yet.
So it’s play control until the regime changes. The problem is that we have no idea when the next opening will be. In 2009, the U.S. had an opportunity to bolster the Green Revolution, but the new President was likely averse to blustering into regime change when he had just extended an olive branch to the existing regime.
Continue the “wait and see” approach. Do not take any decisive action until there is actionable intelligence requiring a new policy prescription. Take it easy, and perform the strategic calculus. Be rational, and get real.
The View from the Bell Tower 